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Abstract 
 
I present two linked arguments related to the ongoing discussion in the field of Science and Technology 
Studies (STS) concerning how expertises should be classified in connection with science-related disputes. 
My first argument is that the ongoing and much debated efforts of STS scholars Harry Collins and Robert 
Evans to create a normative theory of scientific expertises ignore important insights from STS into the 
relationship between scientists and publics. I demonstrate that the goal of new demarcation criteria 
between experts and non-experts is currently being pursued without a sufficient consideration for the 
contrasting frameworks through which publics and scientific communities conceive of science-related 
disputes, and, as a consequence, that the normative theory of expertise, in its proposed form, risks unduly 
favouring representatives of science over those of public participants. My second argument is that, from 
the point of view of STS scholarship, an analytical approach focusing on the processes by which research 
questions are formulated, or framed, is promising in terms of understanding the basis for public 
involvement and stance taking in science-related disputes. While the normative classification of 
expertises is useful for examining the legitimacy by which individuals are involved in science-related 
issues, I demonstrate that the analysis of framing-processes can be used to examine the formulation of 
issues, thereby forming a useful and necessary supplement to Collins and Evans‟ proposed theory. I 
suggest that better understandings of the relationship between scientific experts and laypersons in the 
context of science-related disputes might be achieved by analysing the ability of either group to influence 
the framing of relevant issues in the public sphere. 
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No man can reveal to you aught but that which already lies half asleep 
in the dawning of your knowledge. 
The teacher who walks in the shadow of the temple,  
among his followers, gives not of his wisdom  
but rather of his faith and his lovingness. 
If he is indeed wise he does not bid you enter the house of his wisdom,  
but rather leads you to the threshold of your own mind. 
The astronomer may speak to you of his understanding of space,  
but he cannot give you his understanding. 
The musician may sing to you of the rhythm which is in all space,  
but he cannot give you the ear which arrests the rhythm  
nor the voice that echoes it. 
And he who is versed in the science of numbers  
can tell of the regions of weight and measure,  
but he cannot conduct you thither. 
For the vision of one man lends not its wings to another man. 
And even as each one of you stands alone in God‟s knowledge,  
so must each one of you be alone in his knowledge of God  
and in his understanding of the earth. 
 
Kahlil Gibran 
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1: Introduction 
 
This paper presents two linked arguments related to the ongoing discussion in the field of 
Science and Technology Studies (STS) concerning how expertises should be classified in 
connection with science-related disputes. The first argument is that the ongoing and much 
debated efforts of STS scholars Harry Collins and Robert Evans to create a normative 
classification of scientific expertises ignore important insights from STS into the relationship 
between scientists and publics. I will demonstrate that their goal of new demarcation criteria 
between experts and non-experts is currently being pursued without a sufficient understanding 
of the contrasting frameworks through which publics and scientific communities conceive of 
science-related disputes, and, as a consequence, that the normative theory of expertise, as 
proposed by Collins and Evans, risks unduly favouring representatives of science over those 
of public participants. The second argument is that, from the point of view of STS 
scholarship, an analytical approach focusing on the processes by which research questions are 
formulated, or framed, is promising in terms of understanding the basis for public 
involvement and stance taking in science-related disputes. While the normative classification 
of expertises is useful for examining the legitimacy by which individuals are involved in 
science-related issues, I will demonstrate that the analysis of framing processes can be used to 
examine the formulation of issues, thereby complementing Collins and Evans‟ proposed 
theory on critical points. This paper suggest that better understandings of the relationship 
between scientific experts and laypersons in the context of science-related disputes might be 
achieved by analysing the ability of either group to influence the framing of relevant issues in 
the public sphere.  
As this paper is written as a discussion article, its methodology is largely restricted to 
literature review. I rely primarily on STS literature to investigate the relationships between 
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experts and publics, using discussion articles from the journal Social Studies of Science to 
discuss the debate about Collins and Evans‟ theory of expertises. For literature on framing I 
draw on research from several fields, most notably Cognitive Linguistics, Political Science 
and Sociology. I also present two case studies from the area of Environmental Health (Judd et 
al., 2005) in Chapter 4 to illustrate my argument for the employment of framing-oriented 
perspectives as a supplement to Collins and Evans‟ normative theory of expertises. 
This introductory chapter gives a cursory introduction to the STS debate on the 
classification of expertises. It includes an overview of recently proposed criteria for 
demarcating experts from non-experts, as well as an overview of the criticisms that will be 
discussed later in the paper. Brief summaries of each chapter will be given along with a 
summary of my conclusion, which consists of proposals for increased understanding of the 
relationships between publics and scientific experts involved in science-oriented disputes. 
 
1.1. Debating Expertise 
In a famous allegory from The Republic, Plato recounted Socrates‟ portrayal of a group of 
prisoners chained in a cave since early childhood who, constrained so as always to face the 
back of the cave, grew to describe as true and real the shadows from activity behind them 
which were projected onto the stone walls by a fire (514a-518b). The philosopher, Socrates
1
 
argued, was like a slave released from the cave; his clear-sighted ability to identify the 
underlying reality behind the cave dwellers‟ silhouette-grounded epistemology provided him 
not only with the legitimate right to govern his former fellow prisoners, but also (in light of 
Socrates‟ notion of the ideal, physically and mentally nurtured ruling, or guardian class) with 
the decisive duty to do so (519b-c).  
                                                 
1
 All references to Socrates in this paper refer to Socrates as depicted by Plato, without any 
commitment to what could have been said by the philosopher Socrates as he really existed. 
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As far as Socrates was concerned, those who possessed true insight, grounded in 
philosophy, would be perfectly happy to go about their mental meandering in peace, leaving 
the task of political governance to those more ambitious for power but philosophically less 
apt. But as the former group would be better suited to rule, Socrates argued that an ideal 
political system of governance would compel philosophers to lead. And even though the 
wider populace would, in their ignorance, be more inclined towards preferring the ambitious 
power seekers as their commanders due to the self-taught ability of this group to mimic the 
virtues of leadership, they too would have to be compelled to accept philosophers as rulers.  
It would be a mistake for us, as STS scholars of the third millennium, to dismiss this 
excerpt from The Republic as merely an obsolete attempt to impose a philosophical 
orientation of what we now call scientism. Socrates was in fact attempting to answer 
questions which today‟s scholars still struggle with; how heavily should the authority of 
experts bear upon the processes of governance?, what relationship should exist between the 
different knowledge systems in society?, on what basis, and for what purpose, can a 
normative classification of expertises be constructed?
2
 He made a salient observation as well; 
true experts are not likely to be recognised as such by the general public. 
The view that the task of classifying experts cannot be entrusted to the general public 
resonates with the recent turn towards Studies of Expertise and Experience (SEE), which was 
launched by STS theorists Harry Collins and Robert Evans in 2002. Collins and Evans show 
less confidence than Socrates about the clear-sightedness of experts, however, arguing that 
not even skilled practitioners of science are necessarily capable of identifying the relevant 
types of proficiency in science-related disputes. In their 2002 article, the authors claimed that 
                                                 
2
 Incidentally, The Republic also explores in some depth with another question that is still highly 
relevant to the field of STS; ‟how can true expertise be attained?‟ However, exploring that point here 
would elaborate on an already lengthy digression. 
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the field of STS had grown stuck in a „Second Wave‟ of scholarship characterised by intense 
but aimless preoccupation with breaking down the boundaries between scientific expertise 
and laypersons through focusing its research on the identification of social influence over 
scientific practice (Collins and Evans, 2002, pp. 235-239). In order to progress and to face the 
increasingly acute challenges of weighing the opinion of technical experts against groups of 
stakeholders for political legitimacy, the authors argued that a „Third Wave of Science 
Studies‟ was needed – and with it, a normative theory of expertise.  
Their paper was met with criticism on several points, but it was also widely recognised 
that Collins and Evans had addressed important challenges for STS (Jasanoff, 2003, Wynne, 
2003, Rip, 2003). Several SEE-oriented papers have since been published (Boyce, 2006, 
Carolan, 2006, Giles, 2006, Weinel, 2008), and Collins and Evans‟ proposals from 2002 was 
published in book form in 2007. Among the most important contributions to have surfaced 
from their endeavour so far is the notion of „interactional expertise‟ (Collins, 2004), a skill 
connected with the mediation of tacit knowledge, and the „Periodic Table of Expertises‟ 
(Collins and Evans, 2007, p. 14), wherein scientific expertises are made comparable to 
various forms of lay knowledge. 
One notable response to Collins and Evans was authored by Brian Wynne, who 
criticised the pair‟s lack of engagement with the way that scientific controversies are framed, 
or translated into questions of public meaning (2003, p. 402). He argued that the investigation 
of how „civic epistemologies‟ (Jasanoff, 2005, pp. 247-271,Wynne, 2003, p. 402) affect 
disputes that might be mistakenly understood as being science-oriented would be an 
appropriate alternative to the creation of new demarcation criteria for expertise (Wynne, 2003, 
p. 402).  
This paper presents similar concerns to those raised by Wynne. I will discuss three 
linked criticisms directed towards Collins and Evans‟ lack of attention to the context wherein 
5 
 
 
science-related issues are formulated into technical questions – a process by which issues are 
moved from the sphere of public contestation and into the custody of experts. However, my 
intentions are not to discredit the theory of Collins and Evans, but rather to contribute to their 
project. I discuss attention to the process of research framing as a supplementary tool rather 
an alternative one, and will argue that the analysis of framing processes can be used alongside 
Collins and Evans‟ approach in order to better address three critical points.  
These three criticisms of Collins and Evans are presented in Chapter 2, which is 
subdivided into two sections. Section 1 introduces the central concepts and approaches of 
SEE and Collins and Evans‟ normative theory of expertises, as well as some of the early 
experimental research that the two scholars have conducted to test their notion of interactional 
expertise. Section 2 identifies three criticisms of SEE in its current form. The first criticism is 
based on Sheila Jasanoff (2003), and revolves around the positive arguments for public 
participation in science-related governance, which Collins and Evans largely ignore in their 
attempt to distinguish experts from non-experts. It is argued that their normative classification 
of expertises conflicts with important democratic principles related to citizen participation in 
governance. I draw on the European Commission‟s (2002) guidelines for the appointment of 
expert consultants to illustrate this point. The second criticism deals with Collins and Evans‟ 
attempt to provide a culture-specific justification for their normative theory of expertises, 
which the two authors claim is embedded in specifically „Western‟ principles regarding 
science as an authority on truth judgements. I identify some weaknesses in this clam and 
suggest that the self imposed cultural boundaries of Collins and Evans‟ theory might be 
unnecessarily narrow. The third criticism is based on Wynne (2003), and concerns the neglect 
of Collins and Evans to address the process by which questions are framed in science related 
disputes in the public sphere. The chapter concludes by suggesting that a framing-oriented 
6 
analytical perspective might be a useful supplementary tool in the application of Collins and 
Evans‟ normative theory of expertises. 
Chapter 3 gives an introduction to the concept of framing, attributable to Erving 
Goffman (1974) as a sociological concept used in relation to the contextualisation of 
information and the organisation of experiences, but also used more generally to signify the 
strategic formulation of information. I suggest that the concept has some relevance for 
addressing the problems identified in Chapter 2, arguing that the challenges presented there 
are all rooted in Collins and Evans‟ lack of engagement with the ways in which cultural and 
institutional contexts affect the public perception of science-related disputes. Their neglect is 
problematic because it contributes to a normative theory of expertises where the formation of 
public knowledge bases, what Jasanoff and Wynne refer to as „civic epistemologies,‟ is not 
considered on its own terms, but rather subjected to strictly science-oriented perspectives on 
how problems are identified, formulated and resolved. In order to supplement Collins and 
Evans‟ approach to the study of the boundaries between experts and non-experts, I argue in 
Chapter 3 that framing-oriented perspectives are useful for understanding the interpretation 
and stance-taking of public groups in science-related disputes, and that they are therefore also 
useful for addressing the three challenges to SEE presented in Chapter 2. I will discuss 
possible approaches to the understanding of framing processes in the context of science-
related disputes while also discussing some of the challenges associated with their use. 
While Chapter 3 provides an introduction to the concept of framing and to the breadth 
of definitions of this concept given in the literature, Chapter 4 operates with a narrow 
understanding of the term in order to discuss two case studies from the U.S. State of 
Washington. The case studies, published by Nancy L. Judd et al. (2005), demonstrate the 
potential impact that community involvement in framing processes might have on scientific 
analyses as well as on the dissemination of knowledge in local communities. Describing the 
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participation of Asian and Pacific Islander communities and the Swinomish Tribe in the 
process of framing research questions in the risk analysis of seafood contamination levels, 
both studies demonstrate the benefits of such inclusion for the technical research phase as 
well as for the building of local awareness and interest in seafood safety. I discuss some 
limitations of community participation in framing processes, such as the substantial costs 
associated with facilitating public participation at an early stage of research. I conclude, 
however, that the involvement of publics in research framing has considerable advantages in 
terms of facilitating research that is responsive to public concerns, and that heightened 
attention to the framing process might therefore serve as an important complementary tool for 
STS researchers working under the analytical perspective of SEE. 
 
1.2. Objectives 
In his aforementioned treatise, Plato discussed the notion that there are many different types 
of expertise in a society. But for him, these systems were limited to the proficiency of the 
blacksmith versus that of the farmer or of the carpenter. The subordination of these expertises 
to the authority of philosophy was not to be disputed, as the superiority of logical reasoning 
was seen as self-evident. Today, knowledge of the complex relationships between science and 
society means that we can no longer take for granted the authority of experts as 
representatives of some idea of pure and untainted truth. As STS scholars we must instead 
seek to understand the ways in which different conceptions of knowledge coexist, using our 
insights to improve the processes by which experts are involved in decision making and the 
level of influence which publics are allotted in science-related disputes.  
The act of framing science-oriented questions helps determine the manner in which 
experts are called to pass judgement. Collins and Evans‟ proposed normative theory of 
expertises is only concerned with the selection of relevant experts after relevant questions 
8 
have been established, and not with how these problems are formulated in the first place. I 
therefore argue that the assessment of the levels of expertise possessed by individuals has its 
useful and necessary complement in the analysis of the processes by which science-related 
issues are framed in the public sphere. 
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2: Governing Experts: Recent Developments 
 
I will now introduce recent research in STS on the problems associated with weighing the 
opinions of scientific experts against those of stakeholder groups in science-related 
governance. This chapter focuses in particular on the strategies suggested by Harry Collins 
and Robert Evans (2002, 2007) for policymakers and STS researchers, and on the debate 
which followed their launch of Studies of Expertise and Experience (SEE) in 2002. The 
exploration in this chapter of criticisms and advantages of SEE forms the basis of my 
argument for a framing-oriented, supplementary approach, which will be presented in Chapter 
3 and Chapter 4. 
The chapter is divided into two main sections. Section 1 is dedicated to understanding 
SEE, both in its proposed, idealised form, and in the form that it is currently practiced at the 
Cardiff School of Social Sciences (CSSS). I will outline Collins and Evans presentation of 
SEE based on two key publications, „The Third Wave of Science Studies: Studies of Expertise 
and Experience‟ (2002) and Rethinking Expertise (2007). A selection of SEE-oriented papers 
will also be presented. The section concludes with some reflections on the implications which 
Collins and Evans‟ proposed turn might have for future science-related governance. Section 2 
gives a very brief presentation of three linked criticisms of Collins and Evans‟ SEE 
scholarship and of their normative theory of expertises, drawing primarily on discussion 
papers from Social Studies of Science. The first criticism is directed towards Collins and 
Evans‟ lack of engagement with the positive arguments for public involvement in science-
related governance; the second criticism is that Collins and Evans‟ use of „Western society‟ as 
a cultural alibi for the theory of expertises does not provide a sufficiently strong argument for 
the authority of science on truth judgements; and the third criticism is directed towards their 
neglect to consider the context wherein science-related issues are defined, or framed, and thus 
10 
given meaning. The chapter concludes with a short summary and the suggestion that in light 
of the criticisms discussed, an increased attention to framing processes might form a useful 
and necessary complementary analytical tool for SEE-oriented research. 
 
2.1. SEE and the Normative Theory of Expertise 
Collins and Evans‟ paper „The Third Wave of Science Studies: Studies of Expertise and 
Experience‟ (2002) is an attempt to move STS into a more proactive position with regards to 
the problems associated with weighing the opinions of experts in science-related disputes. It is 
also an attempt to create a normative theory of expertise which accommodates the expertise of 
accredited scientific experts alongside that of experts whose qualifications cannot be judged 
by credentials, while at the same time ensuring that non-experts are excluded from the 
technical aspects of science-related disputes. This STS perspective is presented as having 
practical application in situations where democratic ideals of stakeholder involvement and 
public participation conflicts with the authority of scientific experts in technical disputes. 
Collins and Evans writes that such a turn forms a „Third Wave of Science Studies‟ which 
might run concurrent with the presently dominant „Second Wave‟ of scholarship (2002, p. 
249). They claim that the second wave (which includes the Sociology of Scientific 
Knowledge (SSK)) is characterised by a preoccupation with identifying the social influences 
on scientific activity on one hand, and with „the need to extend the domain of technical 
decision-making beyond the technically qualified élite, so as to enhance political legitimacy‟ 
– the so called „Problem of Legitimacy‟ – on the other (Collins and Evans date the „First 
Wave‟ of Science Studies to the 1950s and 1960s‟ attempts to understand and improve the 
conditions for the perceived success of the sciences) (2002, pp. 235-239). In Collins and 
Evans‟ view, the problem of legitimacy has been replaced by the „Problem of Extension,‟ to 
which STS scholars have to respond. As such, the proposed turn towards SEE is envisaged as 
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both a natural continuation of previous STS scholarship, and, as is implied by the step towards 
a normative theory of expertise, as a more problem-oriented approach to science studies.  
The notion that previous STS research can be grouped into two distinct waves is met 
with strong opposition by critics who see it as a gross misreading of the field (Jasanoff, 2003, 
pp. 389-390, Rip, 2003, pp. 428-429). However, the labels assigned to schools and 
generations of STS research are not particularly relevant in the context of this paper, and will 
not be discussed further. Collins and Evans‟ three wave designation is useful for 
understanding their work, and I will rely on it for the time being. Their separation between 
technical and political phases of science-related debates will likewise be used in this section, 
although some objections against this terminology will be presented later on in the paper. 
Collins and Evans propose that a crucial distinction can be made between the technical 
aspects of debates on one hand, and issues of political legitimacy (stakeholder representation, 
community involvement, etc.) on the other, arguing that this distinction helps define the 
optimum sphere of influence for experts. Early on in their 2002 paper they provide examples 
of „areas where both the public and the scientific and technical community have contributions 
to make to what might once have been thought to be purely technical issues‟; „should you eat 
British beef, prefer nuclear power to coal-fired power stations, ... vote for politicians who 
believe in human cloning, support the Kyoto agreement, and so forth‟ (their use of 
propositional statements as examples of science-related disputes is notable and will be 
examined in Section 2) (2002, p. 236). Collins and Evans argue that the purely technical 
aspects of such questions should be isolated and left up to experts (scientists and 
technologists), and that the technical questions can thus be treated separately from non-
technical questions (moral, ethical, social, etc.), on which technical experts have no special 
authority (2002, p. 236). Collins and Evans‟ three wave analogy, then, refers to the challenge 
of isolating the technical aspects of debates, and restoring the authority of experts on technical 
12 
questions, while at the same time utilising wave two STS research, which they presents as 
having „dissolved the boundary between experts and the public‟ (2002, pp. 235-236). Collins 
and Evans wants to build on the insights gained in previous STS research – which has opened 
up for wider public participation in science-related governance – but they also want to ensure 
that experts are given due authority on technical issues. Because wave two research has 
shown that accredited technical experts are sometimes surpassed in relevant knowledge by 
non-accredited members of the public in science-related disputes, the central challenge in 
wave three will be to identify and recognise such previously neglected persons as experts 
(although not necessarily as scientific experts, see below). The challenges connected with 
separating non-experts from persons whose knowledge and abilities enable them to contribute 
to technical decisions, but who cannot be identified as experts based on certificates, is referred 
to as the „Problem of Extension‟ (2002, p. 235). The motive for the third wave of science 
studies is to move from descriptive to prescriptive statements about the role of expertise in the 
public sphere (2002, p. 240).  
Crucial for understanding Collins and Evans‟ article is their premise that „the pace of 
politics is faster than the pace of scientific consensus formation‟ (Collins and Evans, 2002, p. 
269). This means that at times there will be a need for technical decisions on matters whereon 
no established textbook science exists. Collins and Evans state that the esoteric sciences is be 
the natural point of departure for explaining the benefits of the wave three approach, arguing 
that it is possible to „work outward‟ towards the wider category of „“public domain sciences 
and technologies” (those who directly affect, rather than merely being of interest to, the 
public)‟ (2002, p. 242). The focus on esoteric sciences allow Collins and Evans to explore the 
boundaries between those accredited scientists who can contribute to developing areas of 
research within disciplines, and those who cannot. The authors define „core-scientists‟ as 
small groups of researchers who are deeply involved in research related to a given problem, 
13 
 
 
thereby separating them from disciplinary colleagues who lack the relevant specialist 
knowledge to address the particular esoteric problem area which a publically debated science-
related issue centres on. Collins and Evans claim that this recognition is central to the 
principles of „Western scientific society‟; core-scientists are the ones who are best suited to 
judge on technical aspects of esoteric debates, and identifying those groups is therefore 
essential for discriminating between disagreeing practitioners within a field of research (2002, 
pp. 242-243). 
Collins and Evans not only want to distinguish scientists from core-scientists, but also 
to separate between expert and non-expert publics. They argue that wave two STS research 
has shown the importance of discriminating between legitimate and illegitimate influence 
from public groups over science-related decision making and that demarcation criteria must 
be able to account for the expertise of citizens who are not accredited scientists. Several well-
known case studies from wave two STS research has shown that stakeholders without formal 
qualifications are sometimes able to contribute to knowledge creation, either by shifting the 
focus of research or by pointing out previously unknown processes, in developing branches of 
science (see, for example, Michael Bloor (2000) on the recognition of miners‟ lung disease 
and Steven Epstein (1996) on AIDS activists‟ influence over drug testing processes). Collins 
and Evans focus on one such famous case study by Brian Wynne (1996) concerning the 
responses from Cumbrian sheep farmers to official views about radioactive contamination 
after the Chernobyl disaster. Exemplifying their notion of lay expertise as a category distinct 
from that of scientific expertise, Collins and Evans state that Wynne‟s sheep farmers had 
relevant knowledge about sheep ecology and about the behaviour of rainwater on the fells, 
and that they thus possessed knowledge that was „relevant to the discussion of how the sheep 
and the fells should be treated so as to minimize the impact of the contamination‟ (Collins and 
Evans, 2002, p. 255).  
14 
While all of the above contributions came from members of the public who were not 
scientific experts, each case raised concerns about how one might be able to classify the kinds 
of knowledge and proficiency possessed by citizens so as to make it comparable to the 
expertise of scientific practitioners. It can be noted that Collins and Pinch (2005, p. 153) show 
that in the case of the AIDS activists described by Epstein (1996), some patient activists were 
actually able to attain specialist medical expertise, and as such they contributed to an esoteric 
science on the same terms as core-scientists. The point of Collins and Evans (2002), however, 
is to show that one might establish ways to discriminate between legitimate and illegitimate 
contributions from public groups based on their level of expertise, with the result that public 
participation in science-related disputes can move from being based purely on stakeholder 
representation, or membership of certain groups, to being based on forms of expertise. An 
important inference from this is that third wave demarcation criteria will in some cases 
recommend less, rather than more, public involvement in science-related disputes (Collins and 
Evans, 2002, p. 271).  
Types of technical and lay expertises are established in subsequent publications by 
Collins and Evans. The authors have also published practical experiments which test the 
validity of these new categories. Collins presented a paper in Phenomenology and the 
Cognitive Sciences where he launched the category of „Interactional Expertise‟ as the ability 
to „converse expertly‟ about an area (such as a science) to which one is not able to contribute 
practically, denoting this form of expertise as the defining characteristic of sociologists of 
science, specialist science journalists and other groups who do not themselves practice 
laboratory science (2004, p. 125). The paper presents several theoretical propositions 
regarding interactional expertise. In a response to Wittgenstein‟s famous statement that if a 
lion could speak we would not understand it (originally referring to the radically different 
mental ordering of the world amongst humans and lions), Collins suggests that the underlying 
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reasons for the miscommunication is the different ways in which lions and humans embody 
knowledge, going on to explain that the purpose of increasing one‟s interactional expertise is 
to transcend the boundaries of embodiment (2004, p. 130).
3
 A series of experiments designed 
to test the notion of interactional expertise have also been published by scholars at CSSS 
(Collins, Evans, Ribeiro and Hall, 2006). This paper presents imitation games as a method for 
identifying the interactional expertise of a group of subjects, testing whether colour blindness 
and perfect musical pitch can be credibly hidden or faked, respectively. The results show that 
colour blind persons, who are immersed in a culture whose embodied knowledge of colours is 
different from their own, are able to describe the feeling of having normal colour vision. On 
the other hand, those who do not have perfect musical pitch are not able to mimic this ability 
due to their lack of constant exposure to people who possess this (very rare) skill. These 
results indicate the importance of interactional expertise as a meaningful knowledge category 
in its own right, thereby echoing the arguments made by Collins on previous occasions.  
Collins and Evans‟ 2002 article emphasised the importance of interactional expertise 
as well, using Wynne‟s case study of Cumbrian sheep farmers to illustrate its importance. 
While Wynne had pointed to the reluctance of scientists from government departments to take 
the views of sheep farmers into account, Collins and Evans claimed that the 
miscommunication between sheep farmers and scientists was in fact due to the reluctance of 
the latter group to „develop or to use‟ interactional expertise (2002, p. 256). 
Several experiments with interactional expertise are presented in Collins and Evans‟ 
Rethinking Expertise – a title particularly significant for proposing a „Periodic Table of 
                                                 
3
 A point made in reference to the idea of „embodied knowledge,‟ as presented by Collins (1985), as 
the sum of tacit knowledge inherent in the mastering of a field of expertise, and not, obviously, in 
reference to the hope that humans and lions would one day have meaningful conversations facilitated 
by interactional expertise. 
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Expertises‟ (2007, p. 14) based on early SEE-oriented research. The periodic table combines 
the classification of degrees of expertise within a narrow field of research (contributory and 
interactional expertise being the highest) with other criteria (Collins and Evans, 2007, p. 13-
15). Amongst these are the presence of cultural membership and the ability to navigate in a 
given society, personal dispositions such as „linguistic fluency‟ and „analytic flair,‟ „meta-
expertise‟ – the different levels of professional discriminatory engagement with expertise 
(related to the type of discrimination performed by judges who discriminate between 
testimonies) and „meta-criteria,‟ such as credentials and track record. Collins and Evans thus 
attempt to analyse the notion of expertise by explaining how the influence of cultural factors 
and personality traits can be categorised alongside the proficiency attainable through formal 
training. 
 
2.1.1. SEE: The Right Way Forward? 
In this section I have given a brief outline of the central concepts and approaches to expertise 
that have been suggested by Collins and Evans between 2002 and 2007. Throughout this 
period the two scholars have attempted to re-evaluate the concept of expertise, arguing, 
firstly, that previous STS research had failed to acknowledge the importance of limiting 
public involvement in certain science-related disputes and, secondly, that the task of 
identifying and protecting new categories of expertise is an important and logical next step for 
STS. The most enduring category suggested by Collins and Evans so far is interactional 
expertise – a type of proficiency which has been said by the two to be of central but 
previously unrecognised importance – not only to science studies, but also to several other 
social institutions, such as journalism, law and education, as well as to much of the activity 
done by scientists outside the laboratory, such as peer review and research funding 
assessments. Some experiments have already been conducted to evaluate the existence and 
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nature of this category of expertise, and I have described these early manifestations of SEE 
research as they have been carried out at the Cardiff School of Social Sciences.  
While there has been a great deal of criticism towards Collins and Evans‟ prescriptive 
statements and towards their catchy but distorting
4
 characterisation of previous STS research 
in the three wave analogy, there is no reason to doubt that their perceived need for new ways 
of thinking about experts and non-experts is shared by many leading STS researchers. For 
example, in what is otherwise a highly critical analysis of both the arguments and „rhetorical 
strategies‟ employed by Collins and Evans (2002), Arie Rip (2003, p. 419) states that the two 
are right in claiming that „there is expertise ... which is not recognized by certification,‟ „that 
more “extension”, i.e. more participation by non-specialists, is not always better,‟ and that „a 
normative theory of expertise [is therefore] an important challenge for science studies at the 
present time.‟ Likewise, while characterising Collins and Evans‟ (2002) prescription for the 
problem of extension as „fundamentally flawed,‟ Sheila Jasanoff maintains that their 
identification of new problems for the field of STS is „undoubtedly important‟ (2003, p. 398). 
The fact that „The Third Wave of Science Studies‟ has become the second most cited paper in 
the history of Social Studies of Science (Collins and Evans, 2008) is another indication that its 
authors addressed pertinent challenges for STS at the time of its publication.  
If we can establish, then, that SEE was borne out of the genuine need for the field of 
STS to find new ways to address the problems of legitimacy and extension, the steps that 
Collins and Evans have made towards a normative theory of expertise should be considered 
for its possible practical implications for the appointment of experts in science-related 
decision making, as well as for its possible implications for the conduction of STS research 
and for the future potential of this field for understanding the relationship between scientists 
                                                 
4
 The authors acknowledge that the three wave categorisation paints the field of STS with a very broad 
brush (Collins and Evans, 2002, p. 237). 
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and publics. The shared sense of relevance and urgency amongst otherwise dissenting STS 
researchers shows that the discipline is approaching a crossroads with regards to the practical 
implications of STS research for science-related governance. I argues, therefore, that the 
developing orientation towards SEE needs to be scrutinised not only for its potential benefits 
in terms of addressing the problem of extension, but also for what might be lost when 
researchers aim towards prescriptive classifications of who are, and who are not, experts. If 
SEE really is the way forward for STS, it is crucial to identify its shortcomings at this early 
stage, so that the field might contribute to science-related governance in ways that do not 
conflict with the analytical insights from what Collins and Evans refer to as wave two 
research.  
 
2.2. Criticisms 
This section investigates some of the criticisms that have been raised against Collins and 
Evans‟ approach to understanding expertise. In an attempt to contribute to their project of 
understanding the relationship between experts and publics, subsequent chapters will discuss 
framing-oriented approaches that are complementary to SEE in terms of addressing some of 
the most important criticisms that have been raised against Collins and Evans. Given that the 
objective of this article is to contribute to the understanding of how STS research might 
contribute to the productive use of expertise and public involvement in governance, it is 
important to start out by distinguishing between relevant and irrelevant criticisms of SEE. 
What is most interesting in our context is to examine the long-term significance of 
SEE-oriented research for the relationship between STS and the resolution of science-related 
disputes. To combine a normative classification of expertise with key insights from STS into 
such diverse areas as the complexity of social and material agency in science (Latour, 2005), 
the co-production of scientific knowledge and cultural communities (Shapin and Schaffer, 
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1985) and the gendered nature of knowledge (Haraway, 1996), to mention a few, is a bigger 
challenge than what Collins and Evans seem willing to acknowledge. A normative theory of 
expertise that does not take such highly diverse STS research into account could hardly do 
justice to the insights gained about the relationships between knowledge production and 
society. 
This is the larger issue raised by Collins and Evans recent activity, but it is one which 
has been overshadowed by the many assaults on the details of their „rhetorical strategies‟5 and 
broad-brushed analytical approach. If one accepts, as Collins and Evans have stated on several 
occasions, that SEE in its current form is merely a starting point for addressing important 
challenges,
6
 such as the problems of legitimacy and extension, then one should attempt to 
look beyond the current problems of internal consistency in their suggestions, and instead 
focus on the implications that the realisation of their goal – a normative theory of expertise – 
might have for STS and its potential for contributing to science-related decision making. The 
key concern in this paper is not so much to criticise SEE-in-development as it is to examine 
the wider implications that are raised by SEE in the long term. 
My discussion of the limitations of Collins and Evans‟ approach to SEE will therefore 
largely avoid criticisms that are directed towards the lack of internal consistency of their 
arguments, although it should be mentioned that several such criticisms have been made. For 
                                                 
5
 This characterisation was made by Rip (2003), who took issue with Collins and Evans „tactic of 
positioning themselves as offering just one approach to the Third Wave ... In presenting themselves in 
such an uncharacteristically modest manner, they immunize themselves against substantial criticism, 
arguing that there are other and better alternatives.‟  
6
 Collins and Evans (2002, p. 237, p. 272) state that the proposed understanding of the development of 
STS is just one of several possible interpretations, and also that the proposed turn towards SEE is 
simply one of several possible solutions to the problems of legitimacy and extension. 
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example, Rethinking Expertise was met with scepticism from scholars who protested that 
initial objections which had been raised against Collins and Evans‟ (2002) approach to the 
classification of expertises had not been adequately addressed in subsequent publications. 
Robert Crease (2007) recalls the attacks on Collins and Evans‟ sharp separation in 2002 
between what they called the „technical‟ and „political‟ phases of decision making (see, for 
example, Jasanoff, 2003, p. 394). However, this contested dichotomy is in fact still given 
considerable weight in Collins and Evans‟ 2007 release (pp. 134-142). In a similar vein, 
Michael Lynch points out that many actors are involved in the creation of a single scientific 
contribution (apart from the authors of scientific publications, laboratory assistants, critics 
who help the original authors adjust their claims, funding bodies and other individuals and 
institutions are involved in the creation and presentation of scientific advancements) (2008), 
and argues that Collins and Evans‟ use of the term contributory expertise in the periodic table 
of expertise does not adequately define who might be said to contribute to a field. Lynch‟s 
criticism does not take Collins and Evans‟ individualised focus on core-scientists into 
account, however, and also ignores their treatment of the relationships among expertises 
(Collins and Evans, 2002, p. 40), wherein the category of contributory expertise is isolated in 
relation to other forms of knowledge-based activities.  
There are a number of other criticisms against Collins and Evans which could be 
discussed here, and the prescriptive rhetorical style of the two authors are doubtless 
accomplices in provoking numerous strong responses from leading STS researchers. 
However, my goal is not to reject the validity of their overall argument for SEE and the 
normative theory of expertise. Instead I aim to investigate those weaknesses in their approach 
which have potential consequences for future STS research based on a normative theory of 
expertise. Three linked challenges to such an approach will be emphasised here; that of 
incorporating the positive arguments for public involvement in science-related governance, 
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the challenge of accurately defining the cultural justification for a normative theory of 
expertise, and, lastly, including the public in the process of framing science-related issues. I 
will illustrate the importance of these criticisms by drawing on the European Commission‟s 
(2002) principles and guidelines for the use of expertise, a document which shows 
attentiveness to public involvement at all stages of science-related governance. 
 
2.2.1. Challenge 1: Arguments for Public Involvement 
One criticism raised by Jasanoff against Collins and Evans‟ approach is directed towards their 
„exceedingly narrow formulation of the purpose of public participation in technically 
grounded decision-making‟ (2003, p. 397). Their motivation for public inclusion seems to be 
limited to that of recognising the types of expertise public groups might possess. However, 
this is a limitation which ignores several positive arguments for public involvement in 
science-related decision making.  
Collins and Evans‟ attentiveness to the „visible relevance [of science and technology 
issues] to the public‟ (2002, p. 236) is conditioned by the democratic principle of citizen 
participation, yet the authors fail to properly address the multitude of reasons for public 
involvement in governance, concerning themselves only with the identification of expertises 
among the public and not with any other arguments for social engagement. Contrastingly, 
Jasanoff points to several motives „for wider lay participation in expert decision making‟ 
(2003, pp. 397-398); public involvement adds transparency and democratic legitimacy to the 
activity of institutions – an important argument given the above demonstration of how 
institutions affect knowledge production – and participation helps disseminate expert 
knowledge, thereby „producing enhanced civic capacity and deeper, more reflective responses 
to modernity.‟ This reasoning is related to her writings on „civic epistemologies‟ – a term 
used to capture the basis on which publics assess and attribute authority to truth claims 
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grounded in science (Jasanoff, 2005, pp. 247-271, 2003, p. 394). She also brings up two 
arguments that are central to the context of this paper; first, public engagement serves as a 
check on the way that issues are formulated, thereby helping to ensure that the influence of 
experts are confined to the sphere of relevant technical decisions; secondly, public 
participation allows expert knowledge to be held to cultural standards for what constitutes 
„reliable public knowledge.‟  
Jasanoff‟s objections are less focused on the desire for technically sound judgements 
and more on the underlying principles of democratic thought than what can be said for Collins 
and Evans. Her considerations are similar to those expressed by the European Commission in 
2002, when the importance of public understanding and acceptance in decision making 
processes were given high priority in the Commission‟s guidelines for the collection and use 
of expertise (European Commission, 2002). Acknowledging that the interests of stakeholders 
often go beyond what can be said to be scientific in relation to decision making where 
expertise is needed, and noting that complex issues often require multi- or interdisciplinary 
cooperation and that further challenges are posed by the cultural and institutional diversity 
across Europe, the Commission recommended a focus on planning, dialogue between experts 
and stakeholders, as well as administrative transparency „in relation to the way issues are 
framed, experts are selected, and results handled‟ (European Commission, 2002, p. 1, p. 4, p. 
7). In the Commission‟s guidelines, the identification of expertise, which Collins and Evans 
deemed central to science-related governance, is a problem area outweighed by the 
considerations of accountability and issue framing, both of which are regarded as being of 
central importance for legitimising executive decisions. No equivalent concern is raised by 
Collins and Evans in their aforementioned publications. 
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2.2.2. Challenge 2: Defining Westernness 
Collins and Evans rely on vaguely defined notions of „Western scientific society‟ and 
„Western society‟ to justify the special authority that they want to give experts on issues of 
truth in science-related disputes. In „The Third Wave of Science Studies‟ they state, in 
connection with core-sets, that:  
 
[I]f one takes a really esoteric scientific controversy such as that over the detection of 
gravitational waves, ... then members of Western society know, without having to agonize, that 
anyone who is not a recognized physicist with a great deal of equipment or special theoretical 
knowledge will not be, and should not be, counted as a member of the set of decision-makers 
in respect of the scientific knowledge itself (2002, p. 242). 
 
In the quoted passage the term „Western society‟ is used to designate the supposed public 
consensus from which a normative theory of expertise can draw support, and as such Collins 
and Evans attempt, implicitly, to show that their theory is embedded in an existing cultural 
framework, reminiscent of what Jasanoff refers to as civic epistemology. This particular 
aspect of their analysis remains undeveloped in Rethinking Expertise, which states that those 
who rely on unscientific truth statements (Collins and Evans‟ example of this is newspaper 
astrology) are simply committing „social mistake[s] – they do not know the locations in our 
society in which trustworthy expertise in respect of the influence of the stars and planets on 
our lives is to be found‟ (Collins and Evans, 2007, p. 46). 
While it might be said that Collins and Evans have a fair and straightforward point – 
the authority of experts on truth statements is usually uncontroversial when it is applied in 
governance consultancy in developed countries – their concept of Westernness proves elusive 
when one attempts to define its precise meaning in historical, geographical and cultural terms. 
This is a problematic terminological weakness, because Collins and Evans rely on the 
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perceived values of this undefined Western society as the single extraneous justification for 
their normative theory of expertise. Once they have provided a culture-specific alibi for 
science as the undisputed authority on truth claims, they maintain an exclusive focus on those 
criteria for selecting experts that are already endogenous to scientific practice.
7
  
A valid question regarding the cultural alibi Collins and Evans give for their normative 
theory of expertises is whether the two authors‟ determined commitment to „Westernness‟ is 
unnecessarily narrow, and if their criteria for demarcation between experts and non-experts 
might actually be applied to non-Western cultural settings as well if this restriction could be 
lifted. 
 
2.2.3. Challenge 3: Issue framing 
As mentioned earlier in this chapter, Collins and Evans list several propositional statements as 
examples of science-related issues on which controversy might arise in the public sphere. 
Their approach to the separation of experts from non-experts is based on the presumption that 
the technical aspects of questions such as „should you eat British beef?‟ and „should you 
support the Kyoto agreement?‟ can be separated from the political aspects, on which the 
public should have authority over experts. However, the reduction of science-related issues to 
                                                 
7
 The other factors Collins and Evans bring up to justify their categorisation of expertises are all based 
on criteria which are internal to academic reasoning and procedures that are widely practiced in 
academic circles . Their categories of discrimination (2007, pp. 45-76) is one example of this, being 
based on the methods by which different groups of judges (magistrates, peer-reviewers, advisors in 
granting bodies, etc.) discriminate between the claims of different experts. Another example is Collins 
and Evans‟ ordering of expertises according to the standards of established academic disciplines, 
illustrated by their categorisation of laypersons‟ knowledge as a deficit form of academic knowledge 
(2007, pp. 18-35).  
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propositional statements does not adequately address the process by which scientific issues 
are made into items of public contestation.  
This is demonstrated by Wynne (2003), who states that Collins and Evans 
misinterpreted his case study of Cumbrian sheep farmers when they pointed to the lack of 
interactional expertise as the main reason why communication between the sheep farmers and 
scientists did not succeed. Wynne argues that Collins and Evans failed to recognise the key 
observation in his study of Cumbrian sheep farmers, namely that the framing of science-
related issues (a process which determines what will constitute relevant knowledge) is in 
many cases left to institutions by default (Wynne, 2003, p. 405). By extension, then, the 
diversity of possible interpretations of any given issue among public groups cannot be taken 
into account by Collins and Evans‟ proposed normative framework for selecting the relevant 
experts for a given question, because this framework starts out on the assumption that the 
framing of questions is a straightforward exercise.  
Jasanoff raised an analogous criticism, claiming that Collins and Evans‟ focus on the 
identification of „core-sets‟ in science-related disputes is misguided, and that the challenge of 
identifying the right experts is almost always overshadowed by the vastly more pressing 
questions of „what is going to count as relevant knowledge in the first place‟ (Jasanoff, 2003, 
p. 395). 
The views of Wynne and Jasanoff resonate with those presented by the European 
Commission (2002). In contrast to Collins and Evans‟ focus on prepositional questions as 
idealised notions of science-related disputes, the principles and guidelines for collection and 
use of expertise by the Commission emphasises the importance of the procedures for the 
consultation process, rather than simply its outcome (2002, p. 3). The Commission considers 
awareness of the issue framing process to be of central importance for the legitimisation of 
policy decisions, because the framing process determines the extent to which expert advice 
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will be required to address a given contentious issue. Provided that the authority of experts on 
science-related issues will by necessity infringe on the authority of public opinion, and given 
that the framing of issues is a nontechnical task, the process of identifying and framing 
relevant issues must be democratically justifiable. Such justification can only be provided on 
the basis of culture-specific conceptions of what constitutes relevant truth, or what Jasanoff 
refers to as a „civic epistemology: the criteria by which members of [a given] society 
systematically evaluate the validity of public knowledge‟ (2003, p. 394). The process of 
identifying experts, which Collins and Evans focus on, only becomes relevant after issues 
have been framed in ways that are acceptable to the public. Addressing the process by which 
science-related questions are formulated in the public sphere might therefore serve as an 
important complementary approach to SEE-oriented research. 
 
2.3. Conclusion of Chapter 2 
I have now presented the ideas and concepts of SEE and Collins and Evans‟ normative theory 
of expertise. The ambition of these authors is to move STS into a proactive position where 
knowledge about the interaction between scientific communities and public groups is 
employed in the search for experts and types of expertise that have relevance in science-
related disputes. A key challenge identified by Collins and Evans is that of categorising the 
types of non-scientific, public knowledge that has been identified in several STS studies, and 
as a response to this issue they have published a periodic table of expertises wherein lay 
knowledge is made comparable to scientific categories of expertise. Collins and Evans have 
also suggested that interactional expertise should be considered a relevant knowledge 
category in its own right, arguing that the ability to mediate tacit knowledge is an important 
but largely unrecognised form of expertise.  
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The second section of this chapter has presented three linked criticisms of Collins and 
Evans‟ approach. Firstly, Collins and Evans do not consider the positive arguments for 
including publics in science-related governance so long as these arguments are not based on 
technical considerations, and they thereby subordinate democratic principles to scientific ones 
in their attempt to create formal standards by which non-experts should be excluded from the 
technical phases of decision making. Secondly, the authors do not formulate a clear cultural 
justification for the construction of a normative theory of expertise, presenting instead 
undefined notions of basic tenets of „Western society‟ and „Western scientific society‟ to 
justify the place of their normative theory of expertise in decision-making processes. Thirdly, 
Collins and Evans‟ approach overlooks the framing process which precedes the phase of 
technical problem solving, and as a result of this their normative theory of expertise risks 
further enabling policymakers to effectively exclude publics from participating in decision 
making by formulating problems in technical terms.  
While each of these criticisms are individually important, they are also linked together 
by the common focus on the contextualisation of scientific knowledge and practice. Public 
participation, the perceived „Westernness‟ of science, and the framing processes inherent in 
research planning – all three points are related to the links between scientific claims and the 
perceptions and concerns of publics and stakeholders. This is seen most clearly in Wynne‟s 
objection to Collins and Evans‟ interpretation of his case study of Cumbrian sheep farmers. 
Wynne stated that it was not the lack of a certain type of competence (namely interactional 
expertise) that caused the breakdown in communication between sheep farmers and scientists, 
as Collins and Evans would have it. Instead, Wynne argues that the key analytical insight in 
his case study was that established institutional practices for addressing disputes by default 
contextualised science-related issues in ways that favoured scientific world views over public 
conceptions of what were the relevant concerns; this indicated that scientific practitioners 
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needed to be held accountable for the way in which they formulated problems in the public 
sphere.  
Wynne‟s criticised Collins and Evans‟ lack of attention to the framing of scientific 
disputes as a central component in debates on science, but he did not present a comprehensive 
understanding of the many ways framing processes affect public conceptions of science-
related issues. The following chapters will offer a more detailed understanding of how 
framing relates to the problems of SEE discussed above. 
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3. Framing 
 
The previous chapter presented the third wave of science studies as it has been described by 
Harry Collins and Robert Evans (2002). I explained their reasons for wanting to establish new 
ways of demarcating experts from non-experts and discussed their suggestions for how such 
demarcation might take place. I also presented some limitations in their approach, drawing 
primarily on objections raised by Brian Wynne (2003) and Sheila Jasanoff (2003), who have 
criticised Collins and Evans for their lack of engagement with the epistemological basis on 
which public truth judgements are made. Both of these authors argued that Colins and Evans 
should be more attentive to the formulation of issues in the public sphere, as the seemingly 
neutral description of a science-related problem or challenge might actually contain value-
laden statements which help determine the appointment of relevant experts and inclusion of 
public participants in science-related governance. The notion of framing was brought up by 
Wynne, although he did not offer a definition of the term or any demonstration of how it 
could by applied to the problems of legitimacy and extension.  
The purpose of this chapter is to explore the concept of framing and its relevance for 
the debate surrounding Collins and Evans‟ prescriptive turn in STS. I will show how framing-
oriented approaches, such as framing analysis and public involvement in framing processes, 
might facilitate the understanding of civic epistemologies in relation to science-oriented 
disputes, thereby indicating ways in which framing-oriented STS research can be used as a 
supplementary tool for facilitating the communication between experts and publics. 
I will begin by defining the concept of framing and showing its modern use, before 
moving on to the relevance of framing processes for understanding science-related disputes. I 
will focus in particular on the ways that media and public groups rely on framing to advance 
their views, demonstrating the impact of media framing on public engagement with science. 
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Some challenges related to the use of frame-oriented analysis will also be discussed. The 
framing disputes within and between social activist groups will be presented as a particularly 
promising area of study for understanding the processes involved in the formulation of 
science-related issues in the public sphere – this point will also be explored further in the case 
studies presented in Chapter 4, where the involvement of communities in research framing 
will be presented as a possible approach for addressing the limitations from Chapter 2 in 
policy contexts relying on SEE frameworks. 
 
3.1. Framing: Definitions and Use 
The concept of framing as understood in relation to discourse analysis is commonly traced 
back to anthropologist Gregory Bateson (1972). However, its most elaborate early description 
was given by sociologist Erving Goffman, whose Frame Analysis: An Essay on the 
Organisation of Experience (1974) was the culmination of ten years of work on the 
relationship between meanings and the structure of experiences. It was intended as a major 
statement of sociological importance, but received mixed reviews at the time of its publication 
– particularly for its repetitive and intricate style (Fine et al., 2000, p. XXX, Goffman, 1981). 
Although widely cited, is still regarded as a particularly complex and enigmatic work which is 
frequently subjected to misreading and superficial interpretations (Scheff, 2005, pp. 369-370). 
However, some key ideas and approaches from his original work are easily understandable, 
and will be presented here.  
Goffman investigated frames as those identifiable elements which together make up 
the definitions of social situations (Goffman, 1974, pp. 10-11). Frames can thus be understood 
as the unspoken sets of associations that are used to make sense of situations, statements or 
events – real or imagined. For example, an observation of the seemingly violent interaction 
between two people will be understood very differently depending on whether one invokes 
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the fight or play frame to interpret what is taking place. Desired frameworks are called upon 
in social interaction, and the constitution of official frameworks of understanding is integral to 
institutional relationships throughout society. An example is the infusion of patient-doctor 
relationships with natural (as opposed to social) perspectives, which are imposed so that the 
frames of understanding in which medical personnel approach the naked human body are not 
blurred against the other social contexts in which such contact might take place (Goffman, 
1974, pp. 35-36). The notion of frame, then, is similar to everyday expressions such as context 
and setting, which help observers interpret events, the important analytical distinction being 
that Goffman refers to a theorised notion of what he perceived as basic mental categories, as 
opposed to the larger physical context in which some aspect of reality is being observed 
(although such wider contexts do, of course, influence the mental frames invoked in any given 
situation).  
Goffman‟s frames must be understood in relation to his idea of „strips,‟ which denote 
the empirical basis on which frames can be identified. His definition is relevant for our 
understanding of how frame analysis works, and will therefore be quoted in full:  
 
The term „strip‟ will be used to refer to any arbitrary slice or cut from the stream of ongoing 
activity, including here sequences of happenings, real or fictive, as seen from the perspective of 
those subjectively involved in sustaining and interest in them. A strip is not meant to reflect a 
natural division made by the subjects of inquire; it will be used only to refer to any raw batch 
of occurrences (of whatever status in reality) that one wants to draw attention to as a starting 
point for analysis (Goffman, 1974, p. 10). 
 
It is apparent from this passage that Goffman‟s frames are not simply used to understand how 
events are experienced and interpreted by external observers, but also to describe the meaning 
invested in human activity by the actors involved. It is in this light that his notion of framing 
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becomes relevant for the study of how science-related disputes play out in the public sphere, 
because Goffman gives a practical demonstration of the mechanisms at play in the 
presentation of statements that are seemingly purely factual. The conscious manipulation of 
frames of understanding is central to Goffman‟s Frame Analysis, which describes in detail the 
various ways in which actors might ambiguously or deceptively frame their activity to create 
uncertainty or misunderstandings. Similarly, people might be forced to abandon a desired 
frame in which their activity was meant to be presented, such as when a news anchor is forced 
to speed up his monologue due to sudden time constraints and as such desert any pretence of 
speaking normally (Goffman, 1974, pp. 348-349). Goffman calls this „breaking frame.‟ 
Frame analysis is presented by Goffman as the task of deconstructing strips – the 
object of study – and identifying underlying framing of activity and meaning, which he 
categorises into „realms‟ such as that of the physical world and symbolic representation. 
Frame Analysis gives many examples of how observed strips might be subdivided into 
frames. The act of greeting a neighbour and getting in a car might be broken down into the 
transition between a ritual way for the individual to figure as a representative of himself and 
the bodily management of a physical object (1974, p. 561). Likewise, the act of throwing ones 
racket into the ground after a tennis foul can be considered a „comment‟ on ones playing 
abilities (Goffman, 1974, pp. 570-571). The identification of frames is presented by Goffman 
as an analytical task with the purpose of examining the organisation of experience. 
My objective here is to discuss how awareness of framing processes might contribute 
to the understanding of public involvement in science-related disputes, as well as to discuss 
framing in relation to the SEE debate. Some contrasts between Goffman and Wynne‟s use of 
the term framing should therefore be mentioned. Wynne writes that the crucial shortcoming of 
Collins and Evans is their lack of consideration for „how public issues are framed and thus 
given meaning‟ (2003, p. 402), thereby using framing in the verbal sense as a layer of 
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meaning attached to a message as it is being presented. Goffman‟s frames can also be 
understood in this way, but they most often refer to the mental categories by which an actor 
interpret events. As such he uses the noun form of frames to describe the compartments 
within which actions and expressions are ordered. This difference is telling of how the use of 
Goffman‟s concepts have developed since the publication of Frame Analysis, and it is 
Wynne‟s usage which is prevalent in much of the literature on framing today. 
The study of framing processes has grown increasingly tangible with the advance of 
cognitive science and linguistics, particularly as the mapping of neural computations 
characterising frames has become possible (see for example Jerome A. Feldman, 2006, where 
the identification of neural connections are used to empirically support Goffman‟s notion of 
frames as mental categories). George Lakoff, cognitive linguist and professor at the 
University of California, Berkeley, has written extensively on the use of framing processes in 
political speech, examining the effects of language on the perception of contentious issues and 
actively investigating the frameworks employed by participants in public debates (2004, 
2008). Lakoff has been a leading figure in applying framing research to the political arena, 
even going so far as to establish the Rockridge Institute in order to assist the American 
progressive community in effectively framing issues in order for them to compete with the 
American political right, the latter of which, Lakoff argues, owes much of its success to a 
highly developed understanding of how framing affects public understanding of political 
issues. Many examples are given in his book The Political Mind (Lakoff, 2008), one being the 
intentional positive light cast by on tax cuts by the Bush administration‟s choice of „tax relief‟ 
as the preferred designation, thereby framing the policy in a favourable light as one where a 
burden is removed, while at the same time removing any reference to the positive societal 
effects of taxes. Although the work of Lakoff has been criticised for being unnecessarily 
politically one-sided (Flanagan, 2008) (indeed, the intentional framing of policies can be seen 
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across the political spectrum, and is not simply an American phenomenon – nor is framing 
restricted to the political sphere, it is integral to all communication), his observations are 
important in demonstrating the potency of seemingly neutral, descriptive language in political 
speech.  
 
3.1.1. The Framing of Science 
The role of framing processes is increasingly recognised as crucial for understanding the 
dissemination of scientific knowledge in the public sphere. As the volume of literature on the 
effect of language framing on the efficiency of science communication increases (see, for 
example, Tania Bubela et al., 2009, Matthias Kohring and Jörg Matthes, 2002, Matthew C. 
Nisbet and Chris Mooney, 2007), studies of the framing of contentious science-related issues 
indicate that publics‟ perception of the relevant science, and by extension their position on 
contentious issues, are affected, at times strongly, by the framing used in media coverage (see, 
for example, Michael D. Cobb, 2005, on the effects of framing on American public opinion 
about nanotechnology, Urs Dahinden, 2002, and Matthew C. Nisbet and Bruce W. 
Lewenstein, 2002, on the framing of biotechnology, Myra Marx Ferree et al., 2002, on the 
contrasting influence of American and German media coverage of abortion over public 
opinion and understanding of the relevant medical science, and Patrick O‟Mahony and Mike 
Steffen Schäfer, 2005, on the media coverage of human genome research).  
I argued in the previous that Collins and Evans do not engage with the way in which 
science-related issues are framed, and that they thereby neglect to consider the basis on which 
publics get involved in disputes – what Jasanoff and Wynne refer to as civic epistemologies. 
This omission allow Collins and Evans to emphasise the relationship between publics and 
scientists involved in the technical aspects of science-related decision making as a 
relationship between experts: Scientific experts on one hand and representatives for various 
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non-scientific fields of proficiency on the other. Framing-oriented research offers an 
alternative way of understanding publics engage with scientific expertise, as it casts light on 
the fundamentally different ways in which scientists and public groups relate to scientific 
topics. It brings into focus the factors influencing public opinion which are normally excluded 
from scientific reasoning, such ethical and moral judgements, and is thereby more able to 
account for the epistemological basis on which publics respond to science-related disputes 
without accounting for public views as simply scientifically inadequate. This is the basic 
difference between framing-oriented analysis of science-related disputes and the normative 
approach professed by Collins and Evans. While framing-oriented research does not 
necessarily address the problem of identifying unrecognised fields of science-related 
proficiency amongst the public in the way shown in Collins and Evans„ reading of Wynne‟s 
case study of Cumbrian sheep farmers, it does facilitate the understanding of public 
engagement with science in ways that allow for deeper understandings of civic epistemologies 
on their own terms, rather than on the terms of scientific reasoning. As such, framing-oriented 
perspectives on the formulation of relevant science-related questions in the public sphere is a 
useful supplement to Collins and Evans normative classification of expertise, due to its ability 
to address the formulation of science-related issues. 
Framing-oriented research on the interaction between publics and experts is thus 
useful for allowing public reasoning to be understood as engagement with, rather than 
misunderstanding of, science – resonating with developments in the larger field of STS. The 
view of publics as faulty scientists was fiercely debated by scholars studying the relationships 
between science and society during the 1990s (Locke, 2002), giving rise to strong criticisms 
of the so called „deficit model‟ of the consumption of science among publics and the launch 
of alternative methods for interpreting and assessing the ways in which different groups in 
society engage with scientific claims (Irwin and Wynne, 1996, Locke, 1999). Framing-
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oriented studies of public engagement with science have indicated that the opinions people 
form of scientific claims might be very heavily influenced by media framing due to the way in 
which journalistic framings amplify the tendency of casual readers to rely on superficial 
impressions to make sense of debates, relying „heavily on mental shortcuts, values and 
emotions to make sense of an issue, often in the absence of knowledge‟ (Bubela et al., 2009). 
Dietram A. Scheufele and Bruce V. Lewenstein (2005, p. 661) show that this tendency is 
especially strong in cases where the publics‟ familiarity with the science involved is low, 
pointing to the popularity of the Greenpeace-coined label „Frankenfood‟ to signify genetically 
modified foods as an example of how frames help publics form opinions about scientific 
topics on which popular scientific understanding is limited. Indeed, their study of public 
impressions of nanotechnology shows that the attitudes of publics are heavily influenced by 
the positive framings generally given to the technological and economic promise of this 
emerging field (receiving most of its media coverage in business and science sections of the 
printed press), while the factual knowledge about the risks and downsides of nanotechnology 
is still quite low (Scheufele and Lewenstein, 2005, p. 665). They predict that the advancement 
of nanotechnology will lead to a broader array of tabloid media covering the risks and 
potential conflicts associated with the technology, shifting public opinion accordingly. 
The above discussion gives some insight into the ways in which civic epistemologies 
are affected by the framing of science, although it does not directly contribute to the problem 
of identifying lay expertises in the way addressed by Collins and Evans. However, the 
objective here is to investigate the mechanisms by which science-related issues of 
contestation are given meaning in the public sphere, and on this basis to assess and 
supplement Collins and Evans approach to the classification of expertises.  
The challenges connected with research on framing processes relating to public 
opinion on science-related disputes are to a large extent linked with the general limitations of 
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media-based public opinion research. Susanna Horning Priest‟s (2006) mapping of framing 
processes in the media presentation of gene technologies in Canada and the United States 
represents one framing-oriented attempt to address the relationship between media discourse 
and the public‟s engagement with scientific claims and their subsequent participation of 
science-related governance through democratic participation. In a contrast to Collins and 
Evans, who I have earlier criticised for relying on too vague a definition of „Westernness‟ and 
its perceived social rules of conduct with regards to science‟s authority on truth judgements, 
Horning Priests uses the similarity between Canada and the United States as a starting point 
for investigating how the identification with subcultures might influence the individual‟s 
stance on scientific issues to a larger extent than what can be said for cultural and 
demographic membership. She rejects the analytical category of „lay public‟ as an 
oversimplification, arguing instead that individuals engage with science within the context of 
subcultures which, through the sharing of values and beliefs, „[change] the climate in which 
individual opinions are formed, [lend] expression to collective views, and [shape] the 
formation of public discourse‟ (Horning Priest, 2006, p. 57).  
By contrasting the media‟s methods for issue polarisation via source selection (which 
tends to over-represent activist voices) with the survey-based knowledge that the majority 
population in both Canada and the United States assume a moderate view where scientific 
expertise is generally trusted, Horning Priest demonstrates that the views of relatively small 
groups of activist voices are presented as more widespread than what is actually the case 
(2006, pp. 69-70). Perceived differences in the values attached to gene technology is thus 
more connected with the differences between the organisation of activist groups in Canada 
and the United States than with general cultural differences between the two countries. This 
illustrates the challenges of determining public opinion on contentious issues by examining 
media coverage. It also suggests that the attempts of activist groups to frame science-oriented 
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discussions is an important area of study, as these groups are generally given more media 
coverage and, as such, proportionally more influence over the basis on which public opinion 
is formed than what can be said of the groups holding nuanced, moderate views. Indeed, 
contrary to Goffman‟s focus on frame analysis as a tool for understanding the ordering of 
experiences at the level of individuals, the frame analysis of science-related discourse might 
in fact be most useful in relation to social movements – especially when one deals with the 
debate on controversial issues in the public sphere.  
This is the focus of Robert D. Benford and David A. Snow, who have done extensive 
research on the impact of framing processes by social movements involved in public debates 
on science-related topics (Benford and Snow, 2000, Snow, 2004, Snow and Benford, 1988). 
Benford (1993), for example, builds on observations, participation and interviews with 
members of twelve activist groups within the American nuclear disarmament movement, 
examining as frame disputes the discussions of how issues should be presented to the public 
and how groups should position themselves in relation to other social issues that were seen as 
relating to global disarmament. Benford distinguishes between two different forms of frame 
disputes in the context of activist groups in social movements: Those that take place within an 
individual group, and those involving conflict between activist groups with similar agendas. 
Upon focusing on the framing conflicts between individual groups, he demonstrates that three 
characteristic types of framing conflicts are likely to erupt (Benford, 1993, p. 679). The first 
conflict is related to the interpretation of problems, and was thus rooted in disagreements over 
the diagnosis of a certain challenge. The second conflict is over the ways problems might be 
solved, and over the desired strategies to be followed by individual groups. Benford and Snow 
(2000, p. 626) show that disagreement between activist groups is usually centred around these 
two, the diagnostic and prognostic framings. The third conflict likely to erupt between groups 
is connected with issue framing in the public sphere, reminiscent of Wynne‟s description, and 
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consists of disagreements over how reality should be presented to target audiences. Resolving 
the last conflict means discussing the rhetorical methods to be used to gain public support, 
and involves the strategic management of communication and self presentation as well as the 
weighing of mobilisation against the maintenance of ideological purity. Benford followed his 
subjects over some time, and was therefore able to identify the handling of frame disputes as a 
factor in the success or failure of activist groups (1993, pp. 695-196). Among the negative 
aspects of prolonged internal framing disputes he identifies for activist groups is membership 
decline due to the narrowing of ideological aims, as well as resource depletion as a 
consequence of time and effort deflected from the group‟s goals. Positive aspects of framing 
disputes might include the clarification of a group‟s stance and the promotion of critical 
reflection amongst its members.  
The relevant point to make about the research on framing processes in activist 
movements in the context of this paper is that the study of frames provides an alternative, 
non-scientific point of reference for reviewing the success or failure of social movements and 
other actors involved in the formulation of relevant science-related issues in the public sphere. 
As such, framing-oriented research allows research to be conducted on the ability of science-
related groupings to gain public support, without requiring the technical and scientific content 
underlying their diagnostic and prognostic statements to be scrutinised. On the other hand, 
research based on framing processes does allow the participants‟ strategies for presenting 
messages to the public to be examined – an analytical dimension absent in Collins and Evans‟ 
theory of expertises. 
 
3.2. Conclusion of Chapter 3 
I have discussed the extent to which framing processes are relevant in influencing the grounds 
on which publics engage with science, focusing in particular on the role of media coverage of 
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science-related disputes. I have argued that the understanding of how experts and public 
interact must allow both sides to be understood on their own terms before any separation can 
be made between technical and political phases of decision making, and that the basis for 
civic epistemologies should be approached with a degree of analytical flexibility that allows 
consideration for the fundamentally unscientific basis on which casual consumers of science-
related media coverage might adopt viewpoints in science-related disputes. Building on the 
criticisms presented in Chapter 2, I have argued that Collins and Evans do not show this 
degree of flexibility by neglecting to address the process by which relevant issues are defined 
in the public sphere. I have outlined the importance of framing processes for activist 
movements and for public engagement with science in order to show how this is a crucial 
element in understanding the variety of factors influencing public opinions about science. 
Framing is an important factor in influencing the ways in which information is 
transmitted and interpreted. Studies of how framing affects the understanding of science – 
both generally and with regards to the science relevant in public disputes – is clearly a useful 
starting point for examining the formation of the types of civic epistemologies which Jasanoff 
and Wynne criticises Collins and Evans for neglecting. Whereas Collins and Evans argue that 
science-related governance can be divided into political and technical phases, and that the 
general public should only be able to influence the former (2007, p. 125), framing analysis 
allows for a more flexible approach to the understanding of how publics form opinions about 
science, thus circumventing this much criticised dichotomy. By understanding discussions 
relating to science as revolving around the attempts of actors to frame issues, rather than as 
debates structured first and foremost around scientific reasoning where the relevant task is to 
distinguish experts from non-experts, one might be able to take civic epistemologies into 
account throughout the process of resolving science-related disputes. 
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4. Case Studies 
 
Having examined the spectrum of possible uses of framing-oriented research for the 
challenges connected with SEE, I now wish to turn to some concrete examples of how the 
participation of local communities in the framing of risk analysis can be beneficial for publics 
and experts alike. I present case studies dealing with risk management, as this is a science-
based activity which relies heavily on interaction with and understanding the needs and 
concerns of stakeholders. I will discuss two examples from Nancy L. Judd et al. (2005) where 
research questions related to seafood contamination were framed by University of 
Washington researchers working with local communities and tribal nations. In contrast with 
Harry Collins and Robert Evans, the challenges of weighing the opinions of scientists against 
those of publics are not addressed by Judd et al., whose primary focus is instead the breadth of 
benefits of community involvement in the framing of scientific analyses. I will relate the case 
studies of Judd et al. to the STS debate on expertise and show the different ways in which 
community participation in the framing of research questions complements the approach of 
Collins and Evans, focusing in particular on the three criticisms of SEE that were presented in 
Chapter 2. I will also use the case studies to expand on my discussion from the previous 
chapter on advantages and disadvantages of framing-oriented approaches to public 
involvement in science-related decision making. I will discuss the impact on technical aspects 
of research as well as on issues concerned with policy making and community knowledge, 
concluding that community participation in framing processes has several potential benefits 
for both the technical and political phases of science-related decision making. I will begin by 
introducing the background for the Washington case studies before discussing each of them in 
light of the challenges facing SEE. 
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This chapter operates with a narrower understanding of the concepts of framing, public 
involvement and science-related issues than has been the case in previous chapters. While I 
earlier gave an overview of the different understandings of framing that exists in the literature, 
I will here discuss framing in the sense of issue formulation, which is the way the concept is 
used by Brian Wynne (2003). Public involvement in framing activities will be understood as 
the participation of communities in the formulation of science-related issues according to their 
concerns. The concept of risk management is used with some overlap with risk analysis/risk 
assessment, and the relationship between these concepts are explained below. I discuss the 
framing of science-related issues in relation to seafood contamination for the sake of 
illustrating the potential for public involvement in research planning; however, the discussion 
at the end of this chapter is relevant for public participation in framing processes connected 
with other forms of science-related decision making as well.  
 
4.1. Case Studies 
Judd et al. (2005) give examples of cooperation between researchers and local communities in 
the framing of risk analyses connected with seafood safety. Their case studies from the State 
of Washington in North-Western United States (U.S.) are used to identify preconditions for 
successful public involvement in framing processes and for describing the benefits that might 
be shared by researchers and communities alike as a consequence of framing-driven research 
where communities participate actively in the formulation of relevant research questions. The 
background for their paper is the contact established between University of Washington 
researchers and community groups and tribal nations at the town meeting „Voices for Healthy 
Environments, Healthy Communities‟ in 2000, an initiative launched the National Institute of 
Environmental Health Sciences‟ (NIEHS) Center for Ecogenetics and Environmental Health 
(CEEH) in an effort to stimulate community involvement in shaping research agendas (Judd 
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et al., 2005, p. 1502). The authors discuss cases where researchers working on seafood 
contamination and risk analysis cooperated with communities in the framing of research 
questions relevant both to the specific dietary traditions and needs of individual communities 
as well as to general public health concerns. I will focus on two cases that show publics 
influencing the technical phase of research through their involvement in framing activities.  
 
4.1.1. Case Study 1: Marine Resources for Future Generations 
The first example given by the authors is the Marine Resources for Future Generations 
(MRFFG) (Judd et al., 2005, p. 1504), a project consisting primarily of representatives from 
Asian and Pacific Islander (API) communities cooperating with government agencies and 
nongovernmental partners. The coalition includes the Korean Women‟s Association (KWA) 
and the Indochinese Cultural and Service Center (ICSC), organisations representing citizen 
groups where fish consumption is 3-10 times higher than average U.S. levels due to 
traditional diets and a reliance on subsistence fishing. As a consequence of relatively high fish 
consumption and the differences in sources and types of fish and shellfish amongst various 
groups, the API communities are more exposed to contaminants than the general population, 
making seafood safety an important concern. The MRFFG was initiated to improve awareness 
of safety issues, cooperating with the Washington Department of Fish and Wildlife in seeking 
to increase the awareness of problems associated with illegal harvesting and shellfish 
collection from contaminated beaches. All parties involved in MRFFG sought to promote 
education amongst API communities about the safe harvesting of seafood; however, the role 
of citizen groups proved crucial in the framing of relevant research questions as well as in the 
data collection process itself, and the effort of the MRFFG group thus actively influenced the 
conduction of research. MRFFG investigated the source of seafood consumed locally in order 
to provide the public with safety information relevant to their needs. Multilingual youth from 
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the coalition visited local vendors serving mostly Korean, Vietnamese, Cambodian, Samoan, 
and Filipino community members and asked about the sources of their seafood to determine 
whether it was legally harvested. Based on the information collected in these interviews, 
MRFFG were able to assess the level of awareness locally and also to determine that as many 
as 20% of stores were unaware of the health dangers associated with shellfish contamination 
and illegal harvesting, thus forming a basis for continued community education efforts. Judd 
et al. underline the effect of local initiative and involvement in shaping this research. The 
citizen groups KWA and ICSC helped formulate a research agenda receptive to AIP 
community needs through their involvement in the MRFFG. Secondly, the participation of 
local youth was essential in creating an atmosphere where relevant information could be 
extracted from shop owners in a setting where fear of legal action was minimised – reducing 
the suspicion generated in an interview setting where information is gathered by interviewers 
from outside the community (Judd et al., 2005, p. 1504).  
Based on the MRFFG case description from Judd et al., we can establish that research 
results were influenced by local involvement in two ways: First through the framing of 
research and formulation of research goals receptive to community interests, and secondly 
through the active involvement of local participants whose role in the interviewing process 
determined the quality of data. Further, in relation to SEE, the case of MRFFG is an example 
of how public health and awareness of seafood contamination might combine in a science-
related issue with a degree of complexity surpassing Collins and Evans‟ notion of isolable, 
technical and political phases.
8
 Two linked goals – the mapping sources of seafood at local 
                                                 
8
 It should be noted that Collins and Evans‟ use of the term phase is not meant to imply a temporal 
sequence; ‟the usage owes more to the natural science meaning, where phase refers to the different 
states (solid, liquid, or gas) that a material might take … In a similar way, the same decision might 
move between technical and political phases dependning on the context‟ (2007, p. 124).  
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vendors for the purposes of risk management, as well as the promotion of community 
knowledge about seafood safety and about the purposes of regulation for vendor operations – 
were jointly pursued by researchers and local representatives in a process where the tasks of 
data collection and community education were carried out in dependence on each other. As 
public awareness of seafood safety issues grew through the involvement of local youth in the 
vendor interviewing process, feedback from AIP communities helped create a clearer image 
of local habits for consumption, harvesting and import, in turn improving the basis for 
collecting further information about local seafood safety awareness. While technical 
knowledge about levels and sources of seafood contamination was a crucial element in the 
community education aspect of this case study – forming a basis for educational and 
awareness goals which could be measured by assessing local public health – it is important to 
note that the framing of research questions was made increasingly relevant to the public 
through the involvement of the (political) MRFFG initiative. The two phases described by 
Collins and Evans thus continued to affect each other throughout the project. This observation 
does not imply that Collins and Evans‟ division of technical and political phases is unsound or 
without merit; the case study merely illustrates just how important the process of research 
framing might be in involving a community throughout the resolution of a science-related 
issue, effectively demonstrating why the relationship between experts and publics in science-
related issues cannot easily be reduced to that of making truth verdicts on propositional 
questions. The case of MRFFG is thus useful for showing how stakeholder involvement in 
data collection and research framing can lay the groundwork for community education as well 
as for the calibration of safety regulations in relation to local concerns. 
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4.1.2. Case Study 2: Bioaccumulative Toxics in Native American Shellfish 
The second case study by Judd et al. to be presented here discusses research framing 
connected with issues of sovereignty, water and sediment contamination and community 
customs regarding shellfish consumption (2005, pp. 1505-1506). The Swinomish Tribe runs 
the research project Bioaccumulative Toxics in Native American Shellfish (BTNAS), a 
programme for monitoring shellfish contamination within the Swinomish Reservation – an 
area populated by a Native American population of around 1000, 700 of which are enrolled 
Swinomish members. The reservation is exposed to a number of environmental threats. 
Petrochemical facilities, landfills, sewer outfalls and agricultural land treated with pesticides 
are among the risk factors located within a mile radius of the reservation. The Swinomish 
Tribe commissioned studies from the Washington State Department of Ecology (WSDE) in 
the late 1990s in an attempt to confront local environmental hazards. The results of these 
investigations indicated that additional sampling was needed to map local contaminants and to 
assess potential health implications. This prompted the issue of sovereignty, which is very 
important to the Swinomish, and the planning of continued research depended heavily on the 
issue of project control being resolved on terms acceptable to the tribe. Due to the importance 
of shellfish to the maintenance of the traditional lifestyle of the Swinomish Tribe, its members 
wanted to be in control of research to ensure that questions relevant to them would be 
satisfactorily addressed and that findings would be interpreted in accordance with their 
interests. The community had enough resources to perform their own research, employing 
environmental scientists, maintaining a chemistry lab and running a shellfish monitoring 
program funded by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the Bureau of 
Indian Affairs. They were unfamiliar with the procedures for applying for federal research 
grants, however, and therefore requested assistance from the CEEH in order to draft a 
research proposal. The outcome of this process was the largest research grant ever awarded to 
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a tribal nation by the EPA, resulting in the successful launch in 2002 of the BTNAS project 
with tribal sovereignty over key research framing decisions and data interpretation (seasonal 
field sampling and analysis have been conducted by the project, but the results are not 
discussed by Judd et al., nor are the specific methodological choices of the BTNAS project). 
Meetings have since been organised with neighbouring tribes, offering a local context for the 
sharing of information about research funding and experiences with community-driven 
research (Judd et al., 2005, pp. 1505-1506).  
The BTNAS project has led to shellfish contamination being assessed with a high 
degree of sovereignty and control from the Swinomish Tribe. As such it is an example of a 
community-based, framing-oriented approach to research design where public involvement is 
successful in the sense of facilitating a large degree of participation. At the same time, 
however, the BTNAS project also raises questions about the borders between science framing 
and the technical execution of research. Though Judd et al. emphasise that the technical 
carrying out of research and contamination assessment was in this particular case performed 
by qualified scientific personnel employed by the Swinomish Tribe (2005, p. 1506), the issue 
of Swinomish control over data collection and interpretation – perceived as highly important 
to the tribe – might still be viewed as an interest conflicting with scientific ideals of 
objectivity. The involvement of public groups in framing activities opens up for political 
influence, and as such there is a potential conflict between public participation in framing 
activities and the integrity of what Collins and Evans refer to as the technical phase of 
science-oriented decision making. Collins and Evans‟ criteria for demarcating experts from 
non experts therefore remain crucially important. Without making judgements about the 
scientific practice in the case of BTNAS, it is useful to keep in mind the degree of power 
which can be exerted by those in charge of research framing.  
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4.2. Key Contrasts and Challenges 
Judd et al. focus explicitly on framing in the area of risk management,
 9
 a field where the 
communication of research results to the public is important and where a significant potential 
for public involvement exists. The BTNAS and MRFFG projects are successful in terms of 
enabling local communities to promote research on issues that are important for upholding 
cultural and historical ways of life connected with seafood consumption. Judd et al. 
summarise the advantages of community participation in framing activities by focusing 
primarily on its value for stakeholders through strengthening public awareness and knowledge 
levels; however, they also emphasise the benefits related to successful localisation, which 
include technical aspects of research planning tailored to local concerns. In this respect their 
approach is fundamentally different from that of Collins and Evans, whose primary goal is to 
identify and exclude non experts from the technical aspects of science-related decision 
making. The key difference between the objectives of public involvement in framing and the 
approach of Collins and Evans can thus be characterised as one between fostering the most 
contextually relevant science versus that of ensuring the most expert-based one. My argument 
                                                 
9
 The distinction between risk management and risk analysis/risk assessment has been criticised by 
STS researchers who disagree with the notion that only the former category includes social elements, 
such as those inherent in policy implementation, while the latter categories are purely scientific, and 
thereby largely detached from social influence (see, for example, Judith A. Bradbury, 1989, Sheila 
Jasanoff, 1987). Judd et al. operate with the concept risk management only, despite the fact that both 
the MRFFG and BTNAS case studies show the influence of public groups over the analytical (or 
technical, to use the terminology of Collins and Evans) aspects of risk assessment. While I copy the 
usage of Judd et al. when paraphrasing and summarising their arguments, I also use the term risk 
analysis in my analysis to signify the technical aspects of risk assessment. 
49 
 
 
here is that the two approaches can be meaningfully combined to address technical as well as 
public concerns.  
Some challenges connected with the public involvement in the framing of science-
related issues should be addressed based on the case studies discussed. Judd et al., emphasise 
in particular the significant investments of time and resources that are needed to identify 
opportunities for the involvement of communities in framing activities at an early stage of risk 
management processes (2005, p. 1507). As previously noted, productive connections were 
established between University of Washington researchers, tribal nations and other 
community groups at one of the many town meetings organised across the U.S. by the NIEHS 
– meetings initiated to improve the receptiveness of research projects to the needs of local 
communities. However, while this initiation has proved successful in enabling several 
communities to initiate framing activities related to environmental health risk management, 
the engaging of stakeholder communities in the framing of research questions at an early 
stage of the risk management process represents a significant cost, which must be justified to 
funding agencies in turn (2005, p. 1507). Building awareness of the benefits of public 
participation in framing thus represents a major challenge for the realisation of framing-
oriented approaches to public involvement in science-related decision making. 
 
4.3. Relevance for SEE 
The two case studies presented here indicate that a framing-oriented approach to research 
planning accommodates civic epistemologies by allowing the framing of research objectives 
to be performed by stakeholders as a nontechnical task at the planning stage of research. As 
such, the criticisms that were raised against Collins and Evans in the Chapter 2 can be 
addressed through increased attention to framing processes in SEE-oriented research and in 
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decision making contexts where approaches from SEE – such as the periodic table of 
expertises – are employed. 
The first criticism discussed in Chapter 2 was directed towards Collins and Evans‟ 
neglect to consider the positive arguments for public involvement in science-related decision 
making – an omission grounded in their exclusive focus on expertise as the sole contribution 
of publics to the technical phase of science-related issues. While the two authors are clearly 
justified in considering the ability to contribute to a field of expertise a key criteria for 
demarcating experts from non experts, their discussion of lay expertises reveals a very limited 
conception of the arguments for public involvement in science-related decision making. The 
implication of this narrow focus is that SEE-oriented research might overlook the full 
spectrum of benefits of public participation – focusing instead on such participation as 
exclusively a matter of including lay expertises and other forms of proficiency that are 
included in the classifications of the periodic table of expertises. Sheila Jasanoff (2003, pp. 
397-398) criticises Collins and Evans for underestimating the need and potential for 
„enhancing civic capacity‟ through public involvement in such processes, arguing that citizen 
participation is an important element in the dissemination of scientific knowledge to the 
public. The MRFFG case study demonstrates her point by exemplifying opportunities for 
improving community knowledge on critical issues, while at the same time illustrating how 
public inclusion might impact the technical phase of research. Through involving AIP groups 
in research framing and enlisting local youth to collect relevant data, the MRFFG initiative 
achieved large and high-quality response rates from seafood vendors (benefitting the research 
project) as well as a general increase in community awareness of seafood safety concerns 
(benefitting the community).  
The second objection raised against Collins and Evans in Chapter 2 was related to 
their use of the term Westernness to describe a kind of cultural alibi for the project of 
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identifying categories of expertise. I criticised their failure to provide a clear definition of the 
term, arguing that their usage is unnecessarily restrictive and that it implies that the periodic 
table of expertises holds only limited geographical or cultural validity. For example, their 
elusive usage of the term is problematic when dealing with what is generally considered non-
Western minority cultures within larger Western cultural or geographical settings, such as is 
the case in the process seen in the MRFFG case study (which looks at Asian and Pacific 
Islander communities in the State of Washington). Because the framing of research questions 
to accommodate the needs of stakeholder communities can be performed as a nontechnical 
task, Westernness does not represent a relevant concern for the inclusion of community 
groups in framing activities, and the cultural understanding of Westernness – a restrictive 
element in Collins and Evans‟ analysis – can thus be ignored in a framing-oriented 
perspective.  
Nonetheless, it remains evident that civic organisations that are widespread in 
developed countries remains important for the successful inclusion of publics in research 
framing; the MRFFG and BTNAS case studies show that a highly developed civic society 
might enable communities to initiate and participate more actively in framing processes. As 
was shown earlier in this chapter, both cases started with the active involvement of 
organisations representing the local communities concerned with seafood safety issues. It is 
likely that less organised communities will have difficulty mobilising and raising their 
concerns. This is not only a challenge for public engagement with framing activities, and it is 
also evident in other forms of public involvement in science-related decision making. In 
discussing the potential for implementing community-based participatory research projects in 
China, for example, Robbie Ali et al. (2008, p. 1283) emphasise the general lack of civic 
groupings as a potential hindrance for citizen mobilisation and suggest that state initiation and 
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leadership is vital for any successful coordination of community involvement in research 
processes there.  
The third criticism discussed in the previous chapter revolved around the problem of 
issue formulation. This is the area where public involvement in framing activities most clearly 
complements the SEE approach. Wynne (2003) accuses Collins and Evans of neglecting the 
process of issue formulation altogether, arguing that the authors attempt to address science-
related issues by breaking them down into their political and technical components without 
questioning the process by which the issues are defined in the first place. He criticises Collins 
and Evans‟ neglect of the potential for political, social or other influences being inherent in 
the initial phase of issue framing. This same consideration is also present in the principles and 
guidelines for collection and use of expertise published by the European Commission (2002). 
The Commission emphasises the importance of public inclusion in the phase of issue framing, 
noting that this form of community involvement is important for the accurate formulation of 
scientific research which is responsive to social needs and concerns.  
The MRFFG and BNTAS case studies are examples of successful involvement – from 
the point of view of public participation and democratic legitimacy – of publics in framing 
activities. The MRFFG project collected detailed information about the sources of seafood 
sold at local vendors and about the levels of knowledge about contamination issues in the AIP 
community, while at the same time raising public awareness of such issues amongst 
stakeholder groups. The BTNAS project shows a more independent approach to research 
framing by the Swinomish Tribe, who initiated and executed shellfish monitoring projects 
following the external WSDE assessment of local contamination. In accordance with the 
strong desire of the tribe for sovereignty and control over the formulation of research goals 
and the interpretation of data, the BTNAS project was realised following external assistance 
on the technical aspects of the federal grant application process, but executed through the use 
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of scientific expertise from members of the tribe. Without discussing the specifics of the 
BTNAS project, we can establish that complete stakeholder control of research projects might 
potentially conflict with the ambition for scientific neutrality which is implied in Collins and 
Evans‟ designation of a technical phase of research.  
 
4.4. Conclusion of Chapter 4 
While the earlier parts this paper has focused on the breadth of meanings associated with 
framing, I have used this chapter to discuss the concept in the sense of issue formulation, a 
usage consistent with the criticisms of Collins and Evans raised by Wynne (2003). The 
discussion has been based on the MRFFG and BTNAS case studies involving Asian and 
Pacific Islander communities and the Swinomish Tribe in the State of Washington, 
representing two different degrees of involvement in research framing that have been used to 
illuminate some of the potential benefits and limitations of public involvement in research-
framing processes. I have related each of the case studies to the criticisms of Collins and 
Evans‟ and SEE that were discussed in Chapter 2, arguing that community involvement in 
research framing – particularly when this involvement is directed through organisations 
representing stakeholder interests – has the potential to complement Collins and Evans‟ 
approach with regards to three strands of criticism that has been directed towards SEE. Public 
participation in framing processes need thus not represent a direct contradiction of Collins and 
Evans‟ analysis, but it potentially assists STS researchers and policy makers through 
addressing the weaknesses in the SEE approach that were highlighted in Chapter 2. 
I have stated elsewhere in this paper that a common theme in the many criticisms that 
have been raised against SEE is Collins and Evans‟ lack of engagement with the contexts in 
which scientists and communities interact. The authors set out to construct boundaries 
between experts and non experts without taking into account the messy contexts from which 
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contestation arise on the understandings of what are the relevant concerns of parties involved 
in science-related issues, basing their analysis instead on the assumption that the technical 
aspects of debates can be isolated and thus treated separately from political, social and other 
influences. However, if one accepts that science-related issues might be grounded in the 
collision of knowledge systems, such as between that of scientific approaches and civic 
epistemologies, then it seems that a complementary approach is needed to analyse the phase 
of issue formulation. I have argued that attention to framing processes might serve as a useful 
analytical tool for STS in this context. Furthermore, the case studies of MRFFG and BTNAS 
indicate that the interaction between researchers and community groups in framing activities 
might also be used as a practical, facilitating tool in science-related decision making. 
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5. Conclusion 
 
In his lamentation over the intrusion of publics into the sphere of experts that has in recent 
years been facilitated by the fast development of user-based media, Andrew Keen recounts 
the „edit war‟ that took place between University of Cambridge climate modeller, Dr. William 
Connolley, and an anonymous Wikipedia editor, over the site‟s global warming entry (2008, 
p. 43). After having repeatedly attempted to correct factual inaccuracies, Connolley was 
accused of promoting a subjective „point of view‟ and put on editorial probation – a 
consequence of the site‟s practice of giving all users the same level of credibility regardless of 
their expertise. Keen sees the treatment of Connolley as a symptom of an increasing tendency 
in our society to undermine experts which „threatens the very core of our professional 
institutions‟ (2008, p. 44). In his view, science is not the only sphere of expertise threatened 
by this trend. The integrity of art, music, even culture itself, is at stake. 
Faced with the grim prospects of epistemological and moral decay, it is easy to see the 
motivation for wanting to construct boundaries to protect the authority of experts and for 
wanting to appoint cultural gatekeepers to assess the quality of claims made in the public 
sphere. Harry Collins and Robert Evans have made an important attempt at moving the 
attention of STS from what they perceive as the intense focus of wave two research on the 
revelation of social influences over the scientific process, and over to a third wave of research 
focusing more on the problems connected with distinguishing between publics and experts. 
The intense debate sparked by their launch of SEE attests to the perceived importance of the 
problems they have addressed since 2002. 
Although in dissent over their wave-based terminology and over the legitimacy of 
their normative theory of expertises, the importance of Collins and Evans‟ overall task has 
been admitted by even their strongest critics. I have therefore focused on suggesting ways of 
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improving the basis on which their theory can be used, rather than on one-sidedly criticising 
the SEE approach. In Chapter 2 I quoted Arie Rip‟s negative reaction to the „rhetorical 
strategies‟ of Collins and Evans, where he said that by suggesting that their theory offered but 
one approach to a problem which could be potentially addressed with other alternatives, the 
authors immunized themselves against substantial criticism. Unfortunately I am not able to 
suggest ways to address the criticisms against the SEE approach without adopting this very 
same „strategy‟, as there are already many analytical alternatives by which STS research 
might address the phase where science-related debates are formulated. However, my 
argument, that the increased attention to issue-framing processes is a useful and necessary 
supplement to the normative theory of expertises, is intended  first and foremost as a starting 
point for discussing potential weaknesses of SEE. The description of practical approaches 
that might address the three criticisms raised in Chapter 2 is in any case outside the scope of 
this paper, which has focused instead on the breadth of possibilities attached to framing-
oriented research.  
 
5.1. Summary 
By focusing on three criticisms against Collins and Evans‟ approach, I have argued that there 
are important challenges related to the use of their normative theory of expertises. The authors 
conduct a detailed investigation into the concept of expertise, and are successful in 
establishing criteria by which non-accredited, „lay‟ expertises might be made comparable to 
the proficiency of trained scientists (or indeed to the contributors to any field where a degree 
of attainable skills is involved), as well as in describing and defining the category of 
interactional expertise as an essential component in fields such as STS. However, I have 
argued, based on criticism raised by Brian Wynne, that Collins and Evans‟ analysis rests on a 
simplified understanding of the contexts to which such expertise are applied. In the case of 
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science-related disputes, for example, the authors focus on the ways in which experts can be 
distinguished from non-experts and actors with irrelevant expertise, but they do not discuss 
the process by which experts are assigned problems to solve. The formulation of issues is not 
examined, and as their theory therefore fails to incorporate any checks on the process by 
which science-related issues are established in the public sphere. While this limitation is 
inherent in the authors‟ stated scope (which consists of identifying experts), it does raise 
problems for STS analysts and others who rely on SEE to make distinctions between who are, 
and who are not, legitimate participants in the technical phase of science-related disputes. I 
have therefore argued that a supplementary approach to the normative theory of expertises is 
needed – one which is able to examine the science-related questions addressed by participants 
in debates, instead of exclusively focusing on the skill sets of participants.  
Framing, as described by Erving Goffman, is the process by which experiences are 
interpreted and organised. I have focused on the potential of framing-oriented research to 
investigate the process of issue formulation. My main arguments for such an approach is its 
ability to complement the SEE approach with regards to Collins and Evans‟ blackboxing of 
issue formulation, while at the same time forming a nontechnical basis for addressing the 
ways in which publics assess truth claims and make sense of science-oriented debates. Collins 
and Evans‟ approach to the latter challenge is strictly oriented towards the validity of 
expertise, and as such it offers only a deficit model
10
 by which to understand public 
engagement with science.  
As I have shown, there is significant potential for infusing issues with political, social 
and other influences by those who are in the position to decide what the essential questions 
are in a publically contested issue. Public conceptions of what constitutes relevant questions 
                                                 
10
 This characterisation is made in reference to the periodic table of expertises only, as the express 
purpose of this table is to assess the level of (scientific) expertise of actors involved in debates.  
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are in turn heavily influenced by framing, which is an essential component in communication 
that exerts especially strong influence over public opinion on science-related issues where 
technical knowledge and understanding of the scientific process is low. The crucial role of 
issue framing in the act of convincing audiences has been demonstrated by several case 
studies of social movements involved in science-oriented disputes, a point illustrated by the 
research of Robert D. Benford and David A. Snow on nuclear disarmament movements, 
which showed that contestations (both internally and between activist organisations) over how 
issues should be framed had significant influence over the level of success attained by 
individual groups and, by extension, over the level of public attention to their agendas. I have 
also demonstrated that the attitudes of publics to morally contested science, such as research 
on genetic modification of food, is deeply affected by framing processes. Indeed, one expert 
on framing processes mentioned in Chapter 3 formed a think tank with the express purpose of 
assisting the U.S. progressive political community in the task of favourably formulating 
policies and thereby gaining public support by the use of framing-oriented research. Framing-
oriented research, then, clearly has the potential to address the process by which issues are 
formulated as relevant science-related questions in the public sphere, thus complementing the 
SEE approach and establishing a more sound basis for assessing the levels of expertise 
amongst participants in the technical sphere of debates.  
Aside from the problem of issue formulation, I have discussed two problems with SEE 
that might be addressed by framing-oriented research. Firstly, the positive arguments for 
public participation in science-oriented decision making have been left outside the scope of 
Collins and Evans‟ analysis, an omission criticised by Sheila Jasanoff for ignoring the 
potential of public participation in science-related decision making to improve the collective 
civic capacity for understanding and engaging with scientific questions – what she calls the 
„civic epistemology‟ of society. Secondly, in contrast with the serious potential for their 
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prescriptive theory of expertise to infringe on democratic principles for public involvement in 
decision making, the authors rely on a vague and unexplained definition of „Westernness‟ as a 
cultural justification for their theory, stating that citizens who rely on „newspaper astrology‟ 
and similar sources for truth statements are committing social mistakes by not knowing where 
the credible sources for information are found in our society. While this is certainly true to the 
extent that astrology and similar truth systems are not used as a basis for technical decision 
making in developed countries, I questioned whether Collins and Evans‟ might be 
unnecessarily restrictive by downright ignoring the religious and emotional elements which 
affect the basis on which publics relate to truth statements. Further, their use of the term 
„Westernness‟ implies that SEE is of only restricted cultural or geographical validity. I 
questioned the necessity of this self-imposed limitation. 
Two case studies by Nancy L. Judd et al. were presented in Chapter 4 to demonstrate 
the potential benefits of including publics in the framing of science-related issues. The 
community-based initiatives Bioaccumulative Toxics in Native American Shellfish (BTNAS) 
and Marine Resources for Future Generations (MRFFG) from the U.S. State of Washington 
showed the involvement of stakeholders in the framing of research questions according to 
their concerns, affecting the technical phase of research in both cases. While Judd et al. 
focused on the benefits of public inclusion in framing processes for stakeholders, I argued that 
their case studies can be applied to the discussing of challenges to SEE because they 
demonstrate the benefits of community involvement in framing processes for the technical 
phase of research.  
The BTNAS project saw the establishment of water quality and contamination 
assessments based on seafood safety concerns in a case where local stakeholders considered 
sovereignty and control of data collection and interpretation to be matters of crucial 
importance. The MRFFG project saw the involvement of Asian and Pacific Islander 
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communities in the phase of formulating research questions relevant to local concerns about 
the sources and contamination of seafood, as well as the inclusion of youth in this group in the 
task of collecting data from local vendors. In both cases the participation of local groups 
facilitated local awareness of risk issues. More important for the context of this paper, 
however, is the way that communities affected the technical phase of research by framing 
initial research questions according to their concerns. The successful community participation 
in these two cases rested on high levels of active initiative from stakeholders as well as on the 
existence of organised civic groups that were able to represent local populations, and the 
absence of either factor is a potential hindrance for any successful implementation of framing-
oriented participation. Furthermore, Judd et al. called attention to the general lack of 
awareness of the benefits of local involvement in research framing, calling attention to the 
challenge of justifying the involvement of publics to funding agencies.  
While recognising these challenges, I argue that community involvement in the 
framing of research questions is a framing-oriented approach which addresses the three 
challenges of SEE, thereby complementing the approach of Collins and Evans on the three 
critical challenges described in Chapter 2. 
 
5.2. Observations and Proposals for Further Research 
I have attempted to contribute to Collins and Evans‟ ambition of turning the field of STS 
towards the challenges of identifying relevant types of expertise in science-related debates by 
suggesting ways in which challenges for their proposed normative theory might be addressed. 
While an extensive debate on SEE already exists in the STS literature, I have shown that two 
important criticisms, those of Wynne and Jasanoff, both revolve around the common theme of 
the formulation of issues according to the concerns and level of scientific understanding 
amongst publics. I have on this basis suggested framing-oriented research as a useful and 
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necessary complementary approach to the theory of Collins and Evans. My subsequent 
discussion has intended to raise questions for the future development of their theory, rather 
than to prescribe specific methods, and several challenges therefore remain if one is to create 
a comprehensive approach which complements the normative theory of expertise.  
In terms of STS research and the analysis of issue formulation in science-related 
disputes, relevant research has been cited in this paper. The work of Benford and Snow on the 
framing of science-related issues by social movements is useful for understanding the ways in 
which public, non-expert groups strategically define science-related questions. The two 
scholars also describe the factors which influence the success and failure of framing 
strategies. Substantial amounts of research on the effects of framing on public opinion also 
exists, some of which is cited here. STS researchers increasingly investigate the effects of 
framing on public knowledge about science-related issues, and this focus is also applied to 
some extent in the field of science communication. However, the focus of many of the authors 
cited in this paper is on how framing effects public understanding of science, rather than on 
how it affects their general ideas about scientific truth and their attitudes to the institution of 
science as such. Further investigation into questions of the relationship between science 
framing and the forming of civic epistemologies is likely to benefit the project discussed here, 
which is concerned with the basis for public stance-taking. 
Research on the framing of science need not have an analytical perspective, however. 
As was highlighted by the case studies discussed in Chapter 4, there are significant benefits 
connected with the involvement publics in the formulation of research questions. As such the 
establishment of practical approaches to the inclusion of communities in framing processes is 
an important challenge for analysts and policy makers alike. I have already mentioned the 
lack of awareness of funding agencies about the benefits of community involvement in 
framing processes as a challenge for the attainment of necessary resources for such inclusion. 
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Another important challenge, particularly in developing countries and societies with few civic 
organisations, is the task of mobilising communities in order to be able to take their concerns 
into consideration in the formulation of research questions. 
 
5.3. Conclusion 
There are important reasons for demarcating experts from non-experts. World-leading climate 
change scientists should have authority over anonymous Wikipedia editors who, as Keen 
warns, „for all anyone know, could have been a penguin in the pay of ExxonMobil‟ (2008, p. 
43). Furthermore, the field of STS is well equipped to assess the basis of truth claims that are 
raised from outside the commonly accepted sphere of science (such as the protests of 
Cumbrian sheep farmers against official views about radioactive contamination that are 
presented by their government on the basis of scientific investigation), and for this reason STS 
researchers are in a better position than most to establish a normative theory of expertise 
which take unorthodox and previously unrecognised forms of lay knowledge into account. 
However, the limits of such a theory should be well understood before it is adopted as an 
analytical tool, and even more so before it is put into use by policy makers. SEE is still in 
development, and the constructive criticisms raised in this paper are intended to help cultivate 
it into a fruitful approach to our understanding of the nature of expertise.  
Understanding of how issues are framed in the public sphere is a first step towards 
determining who constitutes the relevant experts in a given science-related dispute. Those 
who manage to define relevant research goals are in the position to invest hidden meanings or 
unintended biases into the questions that experts are assigned to answer. A one-sided focus on 
finding the „right‟ experts for addressing a given question therefore risks legitimising 
precisely the kinds of unwanted influence over science that the field of STS so often sets out 
to expose, making attention to the framing of science-related issues a necessary task. 
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